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Abstract 
 
Financial regulation could be a double edged sword in that despite its major thrust being that to secure 
the financial sector and bring about financial stability; it might have the unintended consequence of 
stifling innovation by the sector. We investigate the nexus between financial regulation and innovation 
by specifically focusing on the insurance industry in South Africa. We demonstrate that there are 
plethora pieces of legislation that govern the insurance industry in South Africa. As such this has 
driven the cost of compliance to unsustainable levels thereby curtailing the spending by companies on 
innovation. We thus would like to caution the policy makers’ that this “heavy-touch” regulatory mode 
is having a pernicious effect on research and development by the insurance sector. As such we 
encourage them to embrace the “light-touch” regulatory mode whereby self-regulation and moral 
suasion are other avenues to be considered. 
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Introduction 
 
The financial regulatory landscape in South Africa has 
experienced a significant evolution over years with 
more requirements being placed on the industry, 
companies and employees alike. This has led to an 
outcry that financial regulation is stifling the prospects 
for financial innovation. The financial crisis of 2007 to 
2009 proved beyond doubt that if markets are left to 
themselves, they can be self-destructive. Biener, Eling 
and Schmit (2014) acknowledge that regulation can 
either impede or promote the development of financial 
services. Less regulation was preferred in Benston and 
Kaufman (1996). They recommended that markets 
must be left to operate freely with little regulation to 
manage the externalities that may arise in the markets. 
In the absence of regulation, consumers will not 
realise the intended benefits from their products and 
investors lose out on their investments. However, it 
would appear that the level of reaction by regulators to 
shocks such as the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis or 
major failures by institutions tends to overwhelm the 
markets (financial institutions). Whereas regulation 
should be viewed positively, it gets viewed as an 
impediment. In this paper we explore the extent to 
which regulation is an inhibitor of financial innovation 
in the insurance industry.   
At the centre of financial regulation is the need 
to protect consumers and investors by ensuring that 
there is financial stability. The other pertinent goals of 
regulation are; removal of barriers to entry, providing 
for recovery in the event of a market or institution 
failure, promotion of competition, avoiding of 
negative externalities from the markets. Most 
regulatory instruments seem to focus on the 
aforementioned objectives. It is noteworthy that in 
South Africa, of the thirteen Acts that specifically 
govern the financial services sector, only two make 
reference to the importance of encouraging 
development in the markets. Of all the Acts, none 
specifically speaks to promotion of financial 
innovation. Notwithstanding the lack of reference to 
financial innovation, the Acts, according to the 
literature are achieving what they are meant for. 
However there is scant research that seeks to quantify 
the impact of regulation in the financial services 
sector, from a product development and innovation 
perspective. This paper seeks to unravel the impact of 
regulation on the development of products and 
innovation in the financial services sector. This will be 
done by establishing whether there exists a nexus 
between the costs of regulation and financial 
innovation in the insurance markets. It is our 
contention that regulation has many benefits as well as 
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costs. We go on to approximate these costs and then 
show whether the costs are indeed an impediment or 
not. 
Costs of regulation are not only borne by the 
financial companies. Consumers pay in the form of 
having to meet the regulatory requirements such as 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Act 38 of 2001), 
(FICA) that requires consumers to submit certain 
documents for identification and proof of income.  For 
companies costs can be direct or indirect. They 
include the cost of running the departments/agencies, 
levies, fees, litigation and arbitration, sanctions and 
transfer fees (Jackson 2007 and Franks; Schaefer and 
Staunton 1998).  Regulation increases cost of 
operation. The regulated institutions need to invest in 
technology if it was absent, report certain transactions 
and keep records for a certain periods among many 
other requirements (Hernández-Coss, Egwuagu, Isern 
and Porteous, 2005). Lee and Chih (2013) stated that 
strict rules could dampen the economy.  Information 
costs, compliance, duplication and surprise costs were 
identified in Bouvatier (2014). Regulation also has an 
opportunity cost (Franks, Schaefer and Staunton 
1998). Further they cite a study by the American 
Bankers Association, which showed that compliance 
cost were $10.7 billion, which was equivalent to 59% 
of the industry’s net income. Unnecessary costs, 
complexity led to loss of the firm’s time. In addition 
they gave minimum capital requirements and barriers 
to new business as costs.   
It is business logic that whatever cost that are 
incurred by the companies must be passed on to the 
consumers. Thus it is possible that costs borne by 
consumers for the products can go up if the costs of 
operation go up.  We also note the nature of financial 
services to give a complete picture of the product that 
is at hand. At the core of financial services 
development is the existence of a need for the specific 
product. Financial services are not purchased for their 
sake; they are bought for the benefits that they offer to 
consumers. In a fast changing world where 
globalisation, regulation, deregulation, technological, 
economic, social, demographic, increased 
consumerism, courts that are pro-consumers among 
other factors have brought rapid changes to the needs 
and the financial services arena, companies are 
constantly faced with the need to remain relevant by 
adapting their products to such change. Research and 
development involves investment of time and money 
by these institutions. We will seek to address the 
extent to which resources meant for innovation are 
diverted or faced with competition by the need to be 
compliant with the different pieces of regulation.  
This paper is arranged as follows; section 1 
provides a literature background to financial 
innovation and regulation, section 2 provides an 
overview of the insurance industry in South Africa, 
while section 3 provides an overview of the regulation 
of the insurance industry in South Africa, section 4 
gives an approximate cost of compliance to FAIS 
regulation and Section 5 concludes.  
 
1 Review of related literature 
 
1.1 The objectives of financial regulation 
 
The objectives of financial regulation are varied and 
amongst others can be enumerated as follows; 
protection of the general public, elimination of public 
externalities from financial failures advancing various 
equitable and redistributive goals and promoting the 
political economy (Jackson, 2007).  According to Lee 
and Chih (2013), notwithstanding that bank regulation 
seeks to improve liquidity and solvency, it does not 
promote efficiency. Leaving the market to itself can 
lead to economic growth problems and instability 
(Vashishtha and Sharma, 2012). Giogio, Noia, 
Carmine and Piatt (2000) cited stability, transparency, 
proper behaviour and competition as objectives of 
financial regulation. The respondents in Vashishtha 
and Sharma (2012) ranked the protection against 
systemic risk as the most important regulatory 
objective followed by the prevention of financial 
crimes as well as creating and sustaining a fair market.  
The objectives of financial regulation as summarised 
by Briault (1999) for the Financial Services Authority 
are; (1) maintaining confidence in the financial 
system, (2) promoting understanding of financial 
system as well as risks and benefits associated with 
different products, (3) consumer protection and (4) 
reducing financial crimes by preventing, detecting and 
monitoring the incidence of crime.  In the next 
paragraph we highlight some of the objectives that are 
contained in the South African legislation. The idea is 
to reveal what the regulators intend to achieve using 
regulation.  
The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 seeks to 
ensure efficient and transparent financial markets in 
South Africa, boost confidence in the market, protect 
regulated persons, reduce systemic risk and promote 
domestic and international competiveness of South 
African financial markets. On the other hand, the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 has 
identification of unlawful proceeds, combating money 
laundering and funding of terrorist activities, 
providing information to investigating authorities and 
collaborating with similar bodies in other countries as 
the main objectives. The all-encompassing Financial 
Advisory and Intermediaries Services (FAIS) Act of 
2002 lists protection of consumers, regulation of 
selling and giving financial advice activities, provision 
of adequate information to consumers and 
establishment of a properly regulated financial 
services profession as its core purpose. Another Act of 
interest is the Credit Rating Services Act 24 of 2012. 
Its objectives are; (1) ensuring responsible and 
accountable credit rating agencies, (2) protect the 
integrity and transparency of credit rating processes, 
(3) protect investors, (4) improve fairness, efficiency 
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and transparency of financial markets and (5) reducing 
systemic risk.   
From the above foregoing, it is evident that the 
goals of financial regulation are dichotomous. 
Nonetheless it can be noted that there is no outright 
objective to promote research and innovation in the 
financial services entrenched by any of the Acts in 
South Africa. However reference to promoting 
competition indirectly suggests that the Acts seek to 
promote innovation through increased competition. 
Effectiveness and efficiency of markets and 
companies is also alluded to. However the Acts do not 
define what that means. Thus it remains open to any 
interpretation. We cannot however say that legislation 
completely ignores or negates issues of innovation, 
research and development.  
 
1.2 The cost of financial regulation 
 
Governments need to ensure that regulation is cost 
effective (Jackson, 2007).  He goes on to say that the 
cost of regulation is easier to measure. However it is 
almost difficult to measure the benefits. Measuring the 
benefits of regulation is almost an impossible task.  He 
however acknowledges that regulation does have 
benefits. Further he says that in the United States the 
discussion on cost benefits of regulation has been non-
existent. Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1998) 
concurred with Jackson 2007 that costs of regulation 
in the UK were not taken into account when regulation 
was introduced or reviewed. Herring (1994) and 
Ferguson (2000) cited in Vashishtha and Sharma 
(2012) contend that the financial crises and increase in 
scams as have their origins in regulation. 
Heterogeneity of legislation across jurisdictions 
impedes the export of financial services.  Bouvatier 
(2014) and Copeland and Mattoo (2007) noted that 
global development of financial services could 
improve efficiency through increased competition. 
This can result in economic growth.  Bouvatier (2014) 
further avers that restrictions and prohibitions are a 
trade barrier on international trade in financial 
services.  However he concluded that it is 
heterogeneity in private monitoring that impeded 
cross-border trade in financial services. Berger, 
DeYoung and Udell (2001) were in unison with the 
sentiments echoed by Bouvatier (2014). They 
postulate that efficiency barriers make it difficult to 
own and operate a financial firm in another country. 
Among the barriers identified were; distance, 
language, culture, currency, and regulation and well as 
deliberate and non-deliberate rules to exclude foreign 
businesses.  The benefits of cross border trade in 
financial services were outweighed by the barriers that 
they identified.  
Combined budgets by treasury departments, 
costs that could be incurred in the absence of 
regulation, additional costs such as litigation and 
arbitrations and the difficulty in showing the 
incremental costs all make the measurement of costs 
of regulation more difficult if not impossible (Jackson, 
2007).  Internal costs, difficulty in showing the 
incremental cost as a result of regulation and difficulty 
in distinguishing between transfer payments and 
deadweight costs to the community make the 
determination of costs of regulation an almost 
impossible task.  
Costs can be direct or indirect. They include the 
cost of running the departments/agencies, levies, fees, 
litigation and arbitration, sanctions and transfer fees 
(Jackson, 2007; Franks, Schaefer and Staunton, 1998).  
Regulation increases cost of operation. The regulated 
institutions need to invest in technology if it was 
absent, keep records for a certain period and identify 
and report certain transactions among many other 
(Hernández-Coss etal, 2005). Lee and Chih (2013) 
stated that strict rules could dampen the economy.  
Information costs, compliance, duplication and 
surprise costs were identified in Bouvatier (2014). 
Regulation also has an opportunity cost (Franks, 
Schaefer and Staunton, 1998). Further they cite a 
study by the American Bankers Association, which 
showed that compliance cost were $10.7 billion, 
which was equivalent to 59% of the industry’s net 
income. Unnecessary costs, complexity led to loss of 
the firm’s time. In addition they classify minimum 
capital requirements and barriers to new business as 
costs.  However they concluded that regulation has 
both benefits and costs. Ren (2011) contends that 
financial regulation as magnifies the procyclical 
nature of financial services. Procyclicality is defined 
as the ability of finance to amplify the dynamics of the 
business cycle (Ren, 2011). Forker and Ward (2012) 
suggested that self-regulation could substitute or 
complement external regulation and therefore lead to a 
reduction in compliance costs. These savings they 
argue could lead to better monitoring by the external 
regulators. 
 
1.3 The challenges posed by multiple 
regulatory regimes 
 
Overlaps and conflict were inevitable and ubiquitous 
due to lack of clear-cut demarcations in the financial 
services sector (Jackson, 1999). This showed a trend 
in the financial markets where the difference between 
institutions seems to have ceased to exist. Financial 
services can now be found even in a supermarket. 
While Jackson (1999) does not advocate for a single 
regulator, but simply warns of the challenges 
associated with multiple legislations in a market where 
there is convergence of financial services in one 
institution, other authors are outright proponents of 
single regulatory authorities. In their conclusion, 
Biener, Eling and Schmit (2014), suggested regulation 
for micro-insurance that does not offer opportunities 
for regulatory arbitrage, separation of insurance and 
micro-insurance regulation. A piece-meal approach to 
regulation has the tendency to create opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage. Vashishtha and Sharma (2012) 
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advocate for a mixed approach to regulation where 
there is a mixture between single and multiple 
agencies. They contend that overlapping jurisdictions, 
too much influence from the government and lack of 
communication and coordination are the major 
obstacles in the effectiveness of legislation. Briault 
(1999) indicated that a few countries had single 
regulators for the whole financial services industry.  In 
the UK the government had argued that the use of 
multiple regulators was costly, inefficient and 
confusing both to the customer and the firms that are 
regulated. Overlaps, inconsistencies and inflexibility 
would be removed by having a single regulator. Hoshi 
and Ito (2004) echoed the same view as Briault (1999) 
by advocating for a single Financial Services Agency.   
The motives for the change in the structure of the 
regulation in Japan sought to remove the political 
interventions, handle insolvencies, separate financial 
authority from fiscal authority, address corruption, 
improve central bank independence and make easier 
coordination (Hoshi and Ito, 2004). Scott (1994) on 
the other hand argues that there should be 
consolidated supervision when it comes to 
conglomerates. That would allow the identification 
and assessment of all risks in the companies that make 
up the group. There is also a need for autonomous 
regulators who have not political interests (World 
Bank, 2006).  
 
1.4 The benefits of financial regulation 
 
The regulation of financial services reduces market 
failures and improves liquidity and solvency (Lee and 
Chih, 2013).  Awdeh, El-Moussawi and Machrouh 
(2007) discovered the existence of a positive 
correlation between bank capital and efficiency. This 
contradicts the conclusions by Lee and Chih (2013) 
who stressed that stricter regulation did not improve 
bank efficiency.  Lee and Chih (2013) however 
acknowledge that there are mixed results from 
different studies.  Herring (1994) and Ferguson (2000) 
contend that regulation bring about reduction in 
transport cost, computation costs, improvement in 
innovation and marketing. Regulation of disclosures, 
licensing, reporting and examination requirement 
could improve the image of the industry and make 
small loan businesses more appealing. Price caps and 
prohibitions can reduce welfare when they result in 
lower product use (McKernan, Tatcliffe and Kuehn 
2013). Vittas (1991) stated that free markets have been 
proven not to be inefficient and ineffective. Further 
the markets suffer from moral hazard, adverse 
selection, free rider problems, and susceptibility to 
imprudent and fraudulent behaviour, instability and 
crisis. Demiriguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2003) 
found out that when legislation restricts entry, bank 
activities and inhibit freedom of banks, higher net 
interest margins will be experienced. Small banks, 
they concluded also had higher net interest margins as 
well as higher overhead expenditures. They however 
did not attribute these higher expenditures to 
regulation.   
Bouvatier (2014) adds to the list of benefits of 
financial regulation by stating that regulation 
improves the monitoring of private sector banks. 
Regulation can compel life insurers to disclose dealing 
costs. Authorization and monitoring procedures and 
systems assist in prevention of fraud and financial 
failure. Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1998) also cite 
the reduction of bank failures as an important benefit 
that may negate the arguments against the costs of 
regulation.  Though Claessens (2006) does not allude 
to regulation, she stated that access to financial 
services was on the increase.  This development 
seemed to coincide with the growth of financial 
services.  The strongest economies with well-
developed and stable financial services sectors owe it 
to a strong tradition of financial regulation (Stiglitz, 
2001). He further argues that financial failures have 
strong spill over or externalities. Commenting on the 
impact of the interventions by governments, after the 
2007 to 2009 financial crisis, Pennathur, Smith and 
Subrahmanyam (2014), were surprised that legislation 
was one of the two out nine factor that had a positive 
impact on the markets. Vitta (1991) concurs with 
Stiglits (2001) and identifies some of the externalities 
such as systemic failure, inflation effects, allocative 
inefficiency and higher prices. More and more people 
and institutions will suffer if a market failure occurs 
and therefore the government must regulate financial 
services provision. Vittas (1991) was in unison with 
Benston and Kaufman (1996) when he concluded that 
competition was the most efficient catalyst for 
innovation and efficiency. Claessens and Klingebiel 
(2001) also agreed that competition improves 
efficiency, improves access to credit and lowers the 
risk of financial crises.  They go on to say that 
competition encourages low costs as well as 
innovation in financial services. However competition 
must not be left to itself, it needs a monitor. 
 
1.5 How much regulation is optimal? 
 
Jackson (2007) refers to level of regulation as the 
intensity of regulation.  He says that the optimal level 
of regulation is when the marginal cost is equal to the 
marginal benefits.  Intensity varies across different 
economies.  Too long and too flexible legislation has 
both produced sub-optimal results (Vashishtha and 
Sharma, 2012). According to Demiriguc-Kunt, Laeven 
and Levine (2003), theory provides contradicting 
relationships on regulation, concentration and 
efficiency. Their findings also confirmed the mixed 
outcomes.  International agencies such as Bassel try to 
stipulate a level of regulation that is fair for 
competition and prudential for regulation (Bouvatier, 
2014). “The only major threat to the future health of 
the financial services industry in the UK is that of 
excessive and inappropriate regulation”, posit Franks, 
Schaefer and Staunton (1998). They further argue that 
if legislation manages to prevent fraud or bad 
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practices, then such costs were justified and inevitable. 
However if the costs did not result in value for money, 
then these costs would harm small firms and hinder 
new entrants into the market.  
According to Stiglitz (2001), the 1997 to 1999 
financial crises were as a result of inadequate financial 
regulation. However in developing countries he says 
that the problem is that of overregulation with 
emphasis on capital adequacy. He goes on to 
emphasize that regulation must not only regulate but 
must empower financial institutions to absorb risks.  
Regulation of financial institutions must be neutral to 
all markets and institutions. That would result in 
higher efficiency and stability in the markets (Vittas, 
1991). According to Benston and Kaufman (1996), 
less regulation and government is ideal. Markets must 
be less regulated because they have performed better 
without the government intervention. While they do 
not supply an actual measure, they contend that 
regulation must only address externalities, which 
could harm markets and consumers if there was no 
government intervention. The results of Vashishtha 
and Sharma (2012) confirmed that legislation evolves 
over time in response to market trends. According to 
Bouvatier (2014) emerging economies needed to be 
involved in the international integration of legislation 
if all benefits were to be realised. The optimal level of 
regulation is less obvious (Claessens and Klingebiel , 
2001). 
 
1.6 The impact of regulation on 
consumers 
 
“We have shown that this regulation does not serve 
the purpose of reducing uncertainty with respect to the 
value of money. In addition, regulation increases 
banks' costs and, hence, increases the cost to users of 
bank money and reduces the efficiency of the banking 
system without necessarily increasing safety”, 
observed Benston and Kaufman (1996). What is 
instructive is that they contend that regulation 
increases costs and that is ultimately borne by the 
customer.  Jackson (2007) mentions that consumers 
pay an indirect tax when regulation works as an 
extraction of wealth from the consumers.  Further he 
alludes to the fact that when consumers are asked to 
supply additional information, then they incur 
additional costs through supplying more information.  
Unnecessary costs are imposed on consumers and the 
banks when excessive capital requirements are made 
(Lee and Chih, 2013). Warren (2008) called for the 
formation of a product safety regulation for financial 
services. She argues that financial products may turn 
put out be very unsafe for consumers. She cites the 
home loan as being capable of leaving your family on 
the streets. Further she argues that 40% of Americans 
worry if they can service their debt every month. 
Disclosures in financial products obfuscate rather than 
inform. She goes on to note that long contracts are not 
helping the consumers. Standard, clear and timely 
disclosures could assist consumers in comparing 
products and coming up with the best choice 
(McKernan, Tatcliffe and Kuehn, 2013). Barr (2008) 
concluded that there was need for regulation that 
realised social failures that emanated from the 
interaction between individual psychology and 
industrial organisation. Vittas (1991) argues that while 
market failure is a condition for regulation, the other 
condition is that regulation must correct market failure 
in an effective and efficient way. Further he argues 
that a sound regulation system is not about placing 
heavy burdens on organisations. Rather it must define 
the ability of financial institutions to exploit 
economies of scale and scope and thus result in 
efficient operations. 
 
2 An overview of the insurance industry in 
South Africa 
 
The insurance sector in South Africa comprises of 79 
long-term insurers and 7 long-term reinsurers, 100 
short-term insurance companies and 8 short-term 
reinsurance companies (FSB, 2012). In South Africa 
the insurance companies that transact life insurance 
business are referred to as long-term insurers. 
Similarly the companies that transact non-life 
(property) insurance are referred to as short-term 
insurers. 
The key metrics of the insurance companies for 
the period 2011 to 2013 are given in Tables 1 and 2 
below. The gross premiums of long-term insurance 
companies show a remarkable growth of 43% from 
about R301 billion registered in 2011 to roughly R430 
billion registered in 2013. On the other hand the 
premiums of short-term insurance companies show 
steady growth of 19% from about R81 billion 
registered in 2011 to the levels of about R96 billion 
registered in 2013. A similar trend is observed when 
evaluating the total assets with the long-term 
insurance industry registering a phenomenon growth 
in total assets of 32% from roughly R1, 7 trillion in 
2011 to R2, 3 trillion in 2013 as compared to the 
short-term insurance industry which shows steady 
growth of about 23% from roughly R90 billion in 
2011 to R112 billion in 2013. 
The information provided in Table 2 depicts the 
investment vehicles of the insurance companies. Thus 
it would seem that the insurance companies both long 
and short-term play a critical role in intermediation, 
savings and resource mobilisation. 
 
3 The regulation of the insurance industry 
in South Africa 
 
The South African insurance sector (both long-term 
and short-term) is regulated by the Financial Services 
Board (FSB). Principally the Short Term Insurance 
Act of 1998 (STIA), the Long-Term Insurance Act of 
1998 (LTIA) the Insurance Laws Amendment Act of 
2008 and the Companies Act of 2008 govern the 
transaction of insurance business in South Africa. The 
thrust in insurance regulation has been to enhance the 
solvency margins of insurance companies through 
prudential (financial soundness) regulations and to 
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foster market conduct. A raft of reforms has been 
implemented and include amongst others, the 
Solvency Assessment Management (SAM) regime 
whose main aim is to improve the capital and solvency 
levels of insurance companies. This is risk based 
solvency assessment management that comes into 
operation in 2016. Market conduct regulation is 
geared towards policyholder protection. Under this 
category, Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) regulations 
have been enacted. These are similar to those 
developed in the UK. Further the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act promulgated in 
2002 makes it mandatory for any person providing 
financial advice to have passed the regulatory 
examination and hence deemed “Fit and Proper” to 
proffer financial advice. 
 
Table 1. Gross premiums and total assets of insurance companies in South Africa 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Gross Premiums  
/ R’mil 
300 650 80 951 358 967 87 675 429 703 96 178 
Total Assets 
 / R’mil 
1 722 777 90 472 2 000 555 101 547 2 278 148 111 686 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from FSB (2013) 
 
Table 2. The investments composition of insurance companies in South Africa 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Cash and deposits 
/ R’mil 
205 790 37 634 221 377 41 780 193 901 42 224 
Government and 
semi-government 
/ R’mil 
191 549 6 963 173 874 9 597 178 194 11 888 
Equities  
/R’mil 
862 648 25 813 1 221 629 28 605 1 470 533 29 946 
Debentures and 
loan stock 
/ R’mil 
128 379 1 666 176 585 1833 215 743 1903 
Immovable 
Property 
/ R’mil 
58 833 - 58 152 - 49 571 - 
Fixed Assets 
/ R’mil 
181 838 1 004 2 112 842 2 367 1 091 
Debtors 
/ R’mil 
94 965 7 265 118 589 7 980 133 930 9 027 
Outstanding 
Premiums 
/ R’mil 
- 5 815 - 7 016 - 8 375 
Other Assets 
/ R’mil 
0 4 311 28 235 3 893 33 909 7 231 
Total Assets 
 / R’mil 
1 724 002 90 472 2 000 555 101 547 2 278 148 111 686 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from FSB (2013) 
 
Table 3 below summarises the Acts under the 
auspices of the FSB. The idea is to show their 
emphases or lack thereof on financial services 
innovation and development. It can be confirmed that 
whilst the FSB, through the Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act is able to manage 
the provision of financial services, the financial 
institutions have a long list of Acts that they are faced 
with over and above the FAIS Act. The number only 
can present a challenge from a time allocation point of 
view. It goes without saying that all the Acts have a 
financial cost of compliance that can be attributed to 
them, though quantifying such costs remains a 
challenge.   
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Table 3. A summary of the Acts governing the Insurance Industry in South Africa. Source: authors’ own compilation (various Acts)  
 
Act Objectives 
Innovation and 
Development 
Emphasis (Yes/No) 
Collective Investment 
Schemes Control Act (Act 
45 of 2002) 
To regulate and control the establishment and administration of collective investment schemes; to amend or repeal 
certain laws; and to provide for incidental matters. 
No 
Credit Rating Services Act 
(Act 24 of 2012) 
To ensure responsible and accountable credit rating agencies; protect the integrity, transparency and reliability of the 
credit rating process and credit ratings; improve investor protection; improve the fairness, efficiency and 
transparency of financial markets and reduce systemic risk.  
No 
Financial Services Board 
Act (Act 97 of 1990) 
To provide for the establishment of a board to supervise compliance with laws regulating financial institutions and 
the provision of financial services; and for matters connected therewith. (Among the issues addressed is the process 
for the setting of levies that financial institutions must pay). 
No 
Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act (Act 38 of 
2001) 
To establish a Financial Intelligence Centre and a Money Laundering Advisory Council in order to combat money 
laundering activities and the financing of terrorist and related activities; to impose certain duties on institutions and 
other persons who might be used for money laundering purposes and the financing of terrorist and related activities; 
to amend the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998, and the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; and 
to provide for matters connected therewith.  
No 
Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act 
(Act 37 of 2002) 
The Protection of the consumer, the financial services industry and all staff employed therein, whether they render 
advice or not, the creation of a profession within the financial services industry and to regulate the giving of advice. 
No 
Financial Institutions 
(Protection of Funds) (Act 
28 of 2001) 
To provide for, and consolidate the laws relating to, the investment, safe custody; and administration of funds and 
trust property by financial institutions; to enable the registrar to protect such funds and trust property; to repeal the 
Financial Institutions (Investment of Funds) Act, 1984 (Acct No. 39 of 1984); to improve the enforcement powers of 
the registrar; and to provide for matters incidental. 
No 
Financial Markets Act (19 
of 2012) 
To ensure that the South African financial markets are fair, efficient and transparent; increase confidence in the 
South African financial markets by; (i) requiring that securities services be provided in a fair, efficient and 
transparent manner; and (ii) contributing to the maintenance of a stable financial market environment; promote the 
protection of regulated persons, clients and investors; reduce systemic risk; and 
promote the international and domestic competitiveness of the South African financial markets and of securities 
services in the Republic.  
Yes 
Financial Supervision of 
the Road Accident Fund 
Act (Act 8 of 1993) 
To further regulate the affairs of the Road Accident Fund; and to provide for matters connected therewith.  
 
No 
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Table 3. A summary of the Acts governing the Insurance Industry in South Africa. Source: authors’ own compilation (various Acts)  
 
Act Objectives 
Innovation and 
Development 
Emphasis (Yes/No) 
Friendly Societies Act 
(Act 25 of 1956) 
To provide for the registration, incorporation, regulation and dissolution of friendly societies and for matters incidental 
thereto.  
No 
Inspection of Financial 
Institutions Act (Act 
80 of 1998) 
To provide for the inspection of the affairs of financial institutions; the inspection of the affairs of unregistered entities 
conducting the business of financial institutions; and for matters connected therewith.  
 
 
Long Term Insurance 
Act (Act 52 of 1998) 
To provide for the registration of long-term insurers; for the control of certain activities of long-term insurers and 
intermediaries; and for matters connected therewith. 
No 
Pensions Funds Act 
(Act 24 of 1956) 
To provide for the registration, incorporation, regulation and dissolution of pension funds and for matters incidental 
thereto.  
No 
Short Term Insurance 
Act (53 of 1998) 
To provide for the registration of short-term insurers; for the control of certain activities of short- term insurers and 
intermediaries; and for matters connected therewith.  
No. 
Financial Services 
Ombudsman Schemes 
Act (37 of 2004) 
To provide for the recognition of financial services ombudsman schemes; to lay down minimum requirements for 
ombudsman schemes; to promote consumer education with regard to ombudsman schemes; to co-ordinate the activities of 
ombudsman of recognised schemes with the activities of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and the Ombudsman for Financial 
Services Providers; to develop and promote best practices for complaint resolution; to empower the Ombudsman for 
Financial Services Providers to act as a statutory ombudsman in certain cases; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith.  
No 
Security Services Act  Increase confidence in the South African financial markets by-  
o requiring that securities services be provided in a fair, efficient and transparent manner; and  
o contributing to the maintenance of a stable financial market environment;  
Promote the protection of regulated persons and clients; reduce systemic risk; and promote the international 
competitiveness of securities services in the Republic of South Africa.  
Yes 
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From Table 3, it can be deduced that most of the 
Acts, do not speak to the issue of financial services 
innovation. The main focus is on stability, solvency, 
consumer protection, registration and deregistration 
and efficient operation of markets and institutions.  
However the Acts stipulate the parameters within 
which financial innovation takes place. Further it 
creates a favourable environment for the operation of 
financial institutions. Briault (1999) confirms that 
regulation must assist in creating competition, which 
is good for financial innovation. He goes on to 
emphasise that legislation must be flexible and 
reflective for the developments in financial markets. 
It is hoped that the regulators will benefit from 
this work in approximating a level of regulation that 
approaches optimum regulation. This paper however, 
does not stipulate a level of regulation that is 
optimum. 
 
4 The cost of compliance 
 
We wish to highlight the cost of compliance is very 
difficult to quantify. This is so because there are so 
many aspects that are covered by the Acts regulating 
the insurance sector in South Africa. As such we shall 
only consider the costs brought to bear upon the 
financial services industry by the FAIS Act. This is 
based on a survey undertaken by The Institute of 
Practice Management done in 2012. This relates to the 
cost of compliance in respect of conforming to the 
regulatory requirements relating to the provision of 
financial advice. Table 4 depicts the average levies 
paid by the financial institutions. These levels are paid 
as follows: (1) he levy charged per financial service 
provider (FSP) for the provision of financial services; 
(2) the levy charged for each Key Individual (KI)- 
referring to people in management roles; (3) the levy 
charged for each representative-referring to all the 
employees who render financial advice and lastly; (4) 
the levy charged per FSP to fund the office of the 
Ombudsman. 
 
Table 4. Average cost of Financial Services Board Levies 
 
Description Amount Number Cost 
Levy per FSP R2960-00 1200 FSP’s R3 552 000 
Representatives Levy R257-00 107 734 R27 687 638 
Key Individual Levy R473-00 12 645 R5 981 085 
FAIS Ombud levy/ FSP R675-00 12 000 R8 100 000 
Source: The Institute of Practice Management (2012) 
 
Over and above the levies the financial service 
sector has to content with the burden of the regulatory 
exams. The average costs incurred by the industry are 
depicted in Table 5 below. Notwithstanding that it 
draws from best practice that, individuals providing 
financial advice must write regulatory exams and be 
deemed competent, the downside to this has been that 
an additional cost has to be incurred by the FSP. 
Companies have to fund their employees to sit for 
these exams. The pass rate is on average 60% and 
hence the 40% have to rewrite the exams. There is 
also the additional cost of preparing for the exam 
requiring that the companies hire educational 
facilitators to workshop their employees. Ultimately if 
the employee concerned fails repeatedly, they are 
made redundant in their job of providing financial 
service.  Since it is difficult to terminate employment, 
this might mean that the FSP up-skill the concerned 
individual who will then be absorbed into a role where 
they would not proffer financial advice, such as 
accounting or human resources. 
 
Table 5. Average cost of Regulatory Exams to Financial Services Industry 2011/2012 
 
Amount Number Amount Cost 
Key Individuals 12 645 R900 R11 380 500 
Representatives 107 734 R900 R96 960 600 
40% KI and Rep Rewrite Exams 48 151 R900 R43 335 900 
Attend RE course 107 734 + 12645/2 R1 000 R60 189 500 
Source: The Institute of Practice Management (2012) 
 
The summary of the costs of compliance as 
highlighted in the above foregoing are given in Table 
6. Suffice to say that it would seem that the cost of 
compliance for financial services provider is very 
high. It is open to conjecture to say that the 
opportunity cost of compliance is the innovation 
foregone. 
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Table 6. Assumed  Average  Cost  of  Compliance  for  a  Key  Individual,  Sole  Proprietor  or Close 
Corporation in the 2011/2012 financial year 
 
Description Action Amount Total Cost 
Regulatory Exams 2 exams R900 R1 800 
Course material 2 courses R1000 R2 000 
Study time 35 hours R250 R8 750 
Compliance-related activities 35 hours R9500 R114 000 
Compliance officer 4 on-site visits plus reports and advice R1000 R12 000 
FSP levies Average per sole proprietor R2960+473+675 R4 108 
CPD 10 notional hours p.a. Min R100 R1 000 
FSB Audit   R8 750 
Accounting Full financials for FSB Min R3500 per month R42 000 
Record-keeping and back- ups  R250 per month R3000 
Source: The Institute of Practice Management (2012) 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The nexus between financial regulation and 
innovation is a pervasive one. In the present study we 
have demonstrated that the cost of compliance by the 
financial services industry is very high. There have 
been so many regulations that have been imposed on 
the insurance industry in the aftermath of the financial 
crises. Amongst them include the solvency regulation 
(SAM), Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) and Binder 
regulations, amongst a litany of regulations. Noble as 
they are, alas they could be curtailing innovation and 
the development of the financial sector.  
We have conjectured that the opportunity cost of 
regulation is the financial innovation forgone in the 
sector. During the period 2011/2012 the approximate 
cost of sitting for financial advisory regulatory exams 
in South Africa was close to R100 million, which 
money could have been put into productive use. As 
such we wish to proffer policy advice and assert that 
overburdening the financial sector, specifically the 
insurance sector somewhat curtails financial 
innovation. This is at the detriment of the consumer, 
who does not benefit from a better financial product 
let-alone who also bears the brunt, in that the cost of 
compliance is actually transmitted down the value 
chain by way of higher premiums.    We thus urge the 
regulatory authorities to embrace “light-touch” 
regulation whereby self-regulation and moral suasion 
take centre stage. 
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